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The next and considerably more incriminating step would be the total abolition of cash. Macroeconomists, like Lawrence Summers, 8 Kenneth Rogoff, and Peter Bofinger, have explicitly demanded such an interdiction. 9 In a purely theoretical world of macroeconomics this might be an advisable step, especially from a predominantly Keynesian perspective. The existence of cash is seen as an effective zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This lower bound might even be a few basis points negative, as there are costs of holding cash. In the real world staggering impediments and detrimental downsides are visible.
In addition, experience shows that this would probably not be the last step. At least in some countries, chances are high that the population would try to protect itself and use other commodities as a means of payment or store of value: seashells, paintings, cigarettes, liquor, precious metals, jewels, vouchers, special drawing rights, foreign currency, just to name a few. In essence, any tangible object, which is relatively rare and cannot be produced without an input of resources, may serve. As a consequence, the possession and the use of precious metals as bullion or coins was inter- Earlier, the Reichsbank had been granted power to require under certain circumstances the exchange of foreign currencies or precious metals into -by that time already almost worthless -domestic currency, section 9 of the regulation of 8 May 1923.
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In a first grasp, these barriers can be divided into three groups:
− Factual or indirect impediments;
− Restrictions based on statutory rules closing channels for the use of cash or making them less viable;
− Outright interdictions by law.
In the present situation, some economists readily acknowledge the abolition as useful and -as experts in constitutional law -quickly come to the conclusion that constitutional concerns are unfounded as a fundamental right for cash did not exist; 13 not really surprising. In any case, the restrictions would serve a good purpose, as they would bestow upon the "unconventional" monetary policy finally the effectiveness it appears to be lacking so far. 14 Lawyers, on the other side, are more in favor of the Odendahl (above n. 13) 5 argument, that the restrictions for using cash would hinder money laundering. 15 It is definitely worthwhile to take a closer look at some of the puzzling questions: On its website, the Bank of England dissolves to some extent the content of the term legal tender as it declares the 'acceptability as a means of payment a matter of agreement between the parties' but gives the debtor 'a good defence in law' if he is sued for non-payment when he has offered to pay the due amount of money in legal tender', cited from Proctor (above n. 24), para 2, 24 footnote 49. The status and function of legal tender in the UK is anyhow awkward as the banknotes issued 9
In general, nobody is obliged to accept them. 32 Another question is whether specific statutes may be enacted to force certain providers of (public) services to accept bank issued instruments of payments, such as credit cards.
33

II. The conformity of an abolition with EU law
The legality of an abolition of cash will essentially depend on whether the EU or the European Central Bank are obliged to create cash denominated in euro. The answer to this question is crucial, since cash has been identified in the preceding paragraph as legal tender and legal tender might be essential. An in-depth analysis of the problem has hardly been undertaken so far.
Foundations
In applying EU law a clear distinction between "primary" and "secondary" law of the Union has to be made. States to define legal tender aside from notes whose issue is authorized by the ECB.
The exclusion of Member States or their central banks from implementing and issuing any other kind of legal tender may be derived from Article 3 paragraph 1 lit. c TFEU which confers the "exclusive competence" in the area of "monetary policy for 52 See for details Selmayr (above n. 51), at margin n. 5, 7, who considers this article as basis for a comprehensive "euro currency law" (margin n. Papapaschalis (above n. 45), at margin n. 44, with the argument that the right of the ECB to authorise the issue of coins would otherwise be infringed; in effect also Selmayr (above n. 51), at margin n. 2. Even on the basis of this interpretation, a competence of the Member States to define legal tender might be construed on the basis of Article 2 paragraph 1 TFEU. AltVerordnungen, Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 1998, p. 771 at 772; consenting Selmayr (above n. 51), at margin n. 8; unclear Häde (above n. 60).
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In so far agreeing de Lapasse (above n. 30), at p. 237; Selmayr (above n. 51), at margin n. 1.
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Whether the specification and unitization of banknotes falls into the competence of the ECB, as it is handled at present supported by the majority of scholars or whether the Council would be allowed to act in this matter following Article 133 TFEU is a question in debate but not relevant for the question here, see for details of the debate Selmayr (above n. 51), at margin n. 16.
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Papapaschalis (above n. 45), at margin n. 1, assumes that both paragraphs regulate legal tender although the second paragraph does not use this term explicitly. mainly concern banknotes, the authorization of its issue and the fixing of its volume.
In addition, it is widely accepted that they also comprise the specification and design and an extension to include other means of payment could have been adopted but had been refrained from.
Finally, the fundamental principle of proportionality would be infringed in case of an abolition of banknotes and coins as legal tender. 78 It is enshrined in the primary law of the EU 79 and the constitutional law of the Member States.
Summing up, a legal obligation to issue banknotes as legal tender or to authorize their issuance has to be acknowledged. 
f) Interim result
The abolition of cash would not be in conformity with the laws of the EU.
III. The conformity of restrictions with EU law
As a total abolition of cash would not be consistent with the law of the EU, it is still to be questioned whether it would be in conformity with EU law to impose restrictions for its use or to erect obstacles which de-facto prevent the use of legal tender. The expectation that legal tender has to be accepted, namely by cashiers of government entities, has been considered as its inherent characteristic. 87 These traits are perfectly consistent with the "State Theory of Money" as outlined above.
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In its judgement on the admissibility of introducing the euro, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has considered as an essential trait of "money" that it can be "freely" exchanged into other goods. In this context, it has emphasized the special protection of this type of legitimate expectation (Einlösungsvertrauen), which it derived from the fundamental protection of property by Article 14 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the German Federal Constitution. (3) For these reasons, arguments from recital 19 have to be dismissed. They lack any normative significance for the legal question to be answered here.
From the property of legal tender follows that it must be accepted (Zwangsgeld). 
IV. The Requirements of German Constitutional Law
Civil rights
The The severity of the encroachment depends on the nature of the specific measure.
Abolition of cash would of course be the most intrusive. The indispensable constitutional justification appears to be questionable. Eventually, a final legal assessment would boil down to a test of the proportionality of the specific measure to be judged.
Applying the principle of proportionality, it has to be examined whether the measure under scrutiny has a constitutionally legitimate objective, is apt to fulfill this objective, is necessary for attaining it, and is proportional in a narrow sense. This means, whether its benefits outweigh its burdens.
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For references see footnote 98.
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German Federal Constitutional Court [BverfGE] 97, 350 at 370.
In the words of the German Federal Constitutional Court money is minted freedom ("geprägte Freiheit"). 95 No sufficient grounds for such an intrusive measure as the elimination of cash are visible. To a lesser degree, but also similar, is the verdict on restrictions of its use. The population has a right to be left alone by the government unless adequate and convincing grounds for onerous actions can be shown.
Social state
The same result may be derived from Article 20 paragraph 1 Basic Law ("social state", Sozialstaat). Restricting the use of issued banknotes and coins denominated in euro would mainly affect the least affluent parts of the population. Especially the aspired "financial repression" has substantial and largely disregarded distributional effects. The distributional effects of greatly reduced interest payments of governmental budgets are unclear but zero interests on savings destroy retirement plans for the lower middle class. At least in Germany, the main assets of this section of the population are bank accounts, life insurances, and other monetary instruments. On average they do not own assets that have profited from the policy like real estate or common stock. Of course, the judgement has to differentiate: The abolition or repression of high denominated banknotes may be onerous for business but not in view of the not so well to do population, mainly protected by the principle of the social state. The existence of easy to handle legal tender with the legitimate expectation that it will be accepted at every business and at every government entity at face value is part of the social-state principle. has to bear the negative effects of being in the status of "default of acceptance". This may be an argument in favor of the decision of the Administrative Court in the case of the contributions for the public law broadcasting system in Germany. 100 For private persons section 293 of the German Civil Code would be relevant. In general, the issuer of legal tender, which does not have a material value close to the nominal value, must enforce the acceptance of this money, otherwise it is a deception of the public trusting in the inherent promise that this token can be freely exchanged into goods and services.
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V. The legal consequences of not accepting cash
VI. Conclusion
From a legal point of view, the elimination of cash would be questionable. An infraction of both the law of the European Union and of German constitutional law appears to be likely. In principle -but to a lesser degree and depending on the details -this also holds for mere restrictions of its use. In France, since the time of the revolution, the "code monétaire et financier" requires that a cash payment has to be accepted if it is the exact sum owed. A right for change does not exist, see Angel/Margerit (above n. 4), at p. 589.
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Examples are given by Angel/Margerit (above n. 4), at p. 588. 100 Above footnote 2. The court failed, however, to understand the monetary law dimension of the case and misinterpreted completely section 14 of the Bundesbank Act stating the property of legal tender. Article 128 TFEU was totally ignored.
